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5. Excellence through equality of 
opportunity – Can increasing the social 
inclusiveness of education systems 
benefit disadvantaged students without 
harming advantaged students?1 
Abstract 
Middle- and upper-class parents tend to think that school systems in which students from different 
socio-economic backgrounds learn together in the same schools would promote equality of 
opportunity but would harm their children. I investigate this belief, making both a conceptual and a 
methodological contribution. Conceptually I broaden the concept of differentiation in education 
arguing that not only formal differentiation but also more ‘hidden’ forms of differentiation such as 
residential segregation or private schools might contribute to a segregation of students from 
different socio-economic backgrounds into separate schools. Methodologically I contribute to the 
debate by analysing changes within countries, controlling for time-constant unobserved differences 
between countries. Using five waves of PISA data for 35 countries from 2000 to 2012, I find that in 
education systems in which schools become more socially inclusive, students from disadvantaged 
families improve their performance. Students from better-off families perform well independent of 
whether the education system becomes more socially segregated or inclusive. Thus, there is no 
conflict between equality of opportunity and excellence in education. In contrast, excellence can be 
improved through equality of opportunity without hindering advantaged students or top performers. 
1. Introduction 
Middle- and upper-class parents often think that a school system in which students from different 
socio-economic backgrounds and with different ability levels learn together in the same schools 
would harm their children, because teachers might need to slow down instruction or because the 
school climate and motivation might worsen. A school system in which students from different social 
backgrounds and with different abilities attend separate schools, on the other hand, can create 
disadvantageous school environments with lower expectations, motivation, and teaching quality for 
low-performing or socio-economically disadvantaged students. This chapter examines whether there 
is such a trade-off: is an integrated school system good for both socio-economically disadvantaged 
and low-achieving students, whereas it hampers both socio-economically advantaged and high-
achieving students? I try to answer this question by making both a conceptual and a methodological 
contribution to the literature on differentiation in secondary education and its consequences for 
educational achievement. Conceptually, I broaden the perspective on differentiation in education 
that often focuses only on formal external tracking. Besides tracking, there are also more ‘hidden’ 
                                                 
1 This is a draft chapter. The final version has been published in: Blossfeld, H.-P., Buchholz, S., Skopek, J., and Triventi, M. (Eds.) (2016), 
Models of Secondary Education and Social Inequality – An International Comparison. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further permission of the publisher, and is for private 
use only. 
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forms of differentiation that contribute to segregating schools in terms of socio-economic 
background and ability. I argue that especially in an international comparison, it is important to take 
into account that there might be other mechanisms than tracking that lead to a separation of 
students in terms of socio-economic background and ability and enlarge inequalities in school 
quality. Therefore, I use the social segregation of schools – defined as the extent to which students 
from different social backgrounds attend separate schools – as a measure of differentiation in 
secondary education.  
In addition to broadening the concept of differentiation, this chapter attempts to make a 
methodological contribution. In the literature, questions about the effects of educational 
differentiation are often addressed by comparing countries with early tracking to those with later 
tracking (Horn 2009; Le Donné 2014). This comparison is problematic if early tracking is related to 
unobserved characteristics. In this case, it is not clear whether students from disadvantaged families 
perform worse in countries with early selection because tracking creates unfavourable learning 
environments in lower tracks, or because disadvantaged families provide more disadvantageous 
learning environments than in other countries – for instance in terms of overlap with other 
dimensions of social inequality such as migration background, neighbourhood conditions, or single 
parenthood. To the extent that these unobserved country differences remain constant, I cope with 
this problem by analysing changes within countries over time using PISA data from five waves. When 
schools become more integrated by socio-economic status, how does this affect different groups of 
students?  
The chapter is structured as follows: I explain the concept of formal and ‘hidden’ differentiation in 
secondary education, discuss why less differentiation might promote disadvantaged children without 
affecting advantaged students, and outline methodological problems. Afterwards, I explain the 
research design and present the results. 
2. Formal and ‘Hidden’ Differentiation in Secondary Education 
Whether students with varying socio-economic backgrounds and abilities are taught together in the 
same schools or attend different schools varies between education systems. This is due to variations 
in formal differentiation, on the one hand, and ‘hidden’ differentiation, on the other. The 
comparative literature on the effects of differentiation in secondary education focuses largely on 
formal differentiation. Formal differentiation means that students are separated into different school 
types or tracks/programmes at some point in their school career. The intention behind is to 
homogenize the student body so that teachers can tailor their instruction to fit students’ needs and 
interests. But because performance, interests, and aspirations are influenced by families, tracking 
strengthens the social segregation between schools.  
However, by focusing only on formal differentiation, one misses more ‘hidden’ forms of 
differentiation. Even in comprehensive education systems, middle- and upper-class parents find ways 
to differentiate their children from others and to ensure that they attend high-quality schools. In 
some countries parents are free to choose their children’s school, reinforcing school segregation 
because school choices vary by socio-economic background. And also schools may select students. 
Nonetheless, even when children are required to attend the school within their district, children 
from varying family backgrounds attend different schools to the extent that there is residential 
segregation (Burgess and Briggs 2010). To sum up, formal and informal differentiation in secondary 
Excellence through equality of opportunity 
 
3 
education entail that students from varying social backgrounds and with varying abilities attend 
different schools. To capture both formal and hidden differentiation in education, I use the extent of 
schools’ social segregation in a country defined as the extent to which students from varying social 
backgrounds attend separate schools (see section 5).  
Formal differentiation is intended to separate students by ability, creating academically 
homogeneous groups. That means that performance variance is high between schools, but low 
within schools. I do not use this indicator of ability differentiation between schools, because changes 
in variance between schools are not independent of changes in my dependent variable, which is 
changes in the performance of different groups of students. However, socio-economic and ability 
differentiation are positively related (see appendix, Figure A1). In general, in the early-tracking 
countries, not only children with varying performance levels but also children from different socio-
economic backgrounds attend separate schools. Therefore, indicators of both formal differentiation 
– such as the age at the first selection – and informal differentiation – such as the socio-economic 
segregation among schools – would classify these education systems as unequal (appendix, Figure 
A2). However, there are also countries without early selection such as the United States that are 
nonetheless characterized by a high socio-economic segregation among schools. Thus, even though 
both Finland and the United States separate students only at the age of 16, the Nordic countries have 
the most socially inclusive education systems, whereas the United States’ education system is one of 
the most socially segregated. These differences cannot be captured with an indicator of formal 
differentiation, which is why I use the socio-economic segregation among schools as my indicator of 
an education system’s informal differentiation.    
3. Why less differentiation might boost disadvantaged students’ 
performance without harming advantaged students 
Why might an education system’s socio-economic segregation matter for students’ performance? 
The concentration of socio-economically disadvantaged students creates disadvantaged schools in 
terms of peers, teachers, and instruction. Peer effects might lead to a worse school climate and 
motivation and influence the quality of instruction. In schools with more students from 
disadvantaged families and seemingly lower ability, teachers tend to have lower expectations and 
slow down the pace of instruction. Schools with many students who are perceived to be difficult 
have problems attracting good teachers (Gamoran and Berends 1987). When schools are perceived 
to be of low quality and have problems attracting good teachers, parents with high educational 
aspirations will try to avoid them. This reinforces the concentration of disadvantaged students in 
these schools. Because differentiation in terms of socio-economic background traps students from 
disadvantaged families in disadvantageous schools (Oakes 1985; Gamoran and Berends 1987; Bifulco 
et al. 2008), I expect that students from disadvantaged families will perform worse in socially 
segregated education systems (Hypothesis 1). 
The advocates of more differentiation fear that high-performing students and those from socio-
economically advantaged families are hampered if they are taught together with students from 
disadvantaged families who tend to perform worse at school (Hoxby 2003). For example, most 
parents in Germany believe that it is better for good students to be taught together with other good 
students (Süßlin 2013). Taking these positions together, there might be a trade-off between the 
promotion of high-performing and socio-economically advantaged students on the one side, and 
low-performing and socio-economically disadvantaged students on the other side.  
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Against the view of a trade-off, however, there are arguments why students from disadvantaged 
families would benefit from an inclusive school system, whereas students from advantaged families 
would not lose: good learning opportunities at school might be especially important for students 
from lower socio-economic groups and migrants because they could potentially compensate for less 
stimulation and support in families (Coleman 1966; Alexander et al. 2001). Socio-economically 
advantaged students, on the other hand, might succeed anyway, either because their parents are 
able to compensate for a bad school, or because school quality does not deteriorate even when the 
student body becomes more mixed. School quality might not suffer either because advantaged 
parents hold teachers responsible for their teaching or because more advanced students can gain a 
deeper understanding while explaining something to less advanced students and thereby benefit 
from an enriched classroom discussion including more diverse perspectives. To sum up, children 
from privileged families might not be harmed by an integrated education system but will succeed 
anyway.  
Building on these arguments, my hypothesis is that there is no trade-off between the performance of 
students from different social backgrounds and with different abilities: When an education system 
becomes more integrated by socio-economic background, socio-economically disadvantaged and 
low-performing students will benefit (Hypothesis 1), whereas there will be no consistent negative 
effect for students from socio-economically advantaged families or for high performers (Hypothesis 
2). Thus, the argument is that there is no trade-off between equality of opportunity and excellence in 
education.  
4. Literature and methodological challenges  
There are two main methodological approaches to analysing the effect of differentiation on students’ 
performance. One is to compare countries with different education systems and the second is to 
evaluate institutional reforms. Conceptually, both approaches focus on formal differentiation only, 
leaving aside more ‘hidden’ forms of differentiation.  
Exploiting institutional differences between school systems, the comparative literature shows that in 
early-tracking school systems the effect of social background on students’ performance in PISA is 
stronger than in comprehensive school systems (Horn 2009; Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010). This 
comes without an advantage in the average performance level, because students from 
disadvantaged families perform better in countries with a later age of selection, whereas students 
from advantaged families perform similarly in countries with early and late selection (Horn 2009; Van 
de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010; Le Donné 2014). Thus, the comparative literature finds no trade-off 
between equality of opportunity and excellence.  
Conceptually, the comparative literature focuses on formal differentiation, using as indicators the 
age of the first selection in an education system and the number of different tracks available. Le 
Donné (2014) broadens the perspective by including the amount of selective schools and private 
schools with fees. Nonetheless, school differentiation due to residential segregation cannot be 
captured with these variables.  
One methodological challenge is that educational differentiation might be interwoven with 
unobserved societal characteristics such as socioeconomic inequality or ethnic diversity. Therefore, 
achievement gaps may already be larger in early tracking countries before they separate students 
into different tracks. To cope with this problem, Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) use a ‘difference-
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in-difference’ approach. They compare how inequality of outcomes develops from the end of 
primary school to the end of lower secondary school in countries that track students in-between 
these time points and in countries that do not. Using TIMSS and PIRLS data for 4th graders and PISA 
data for 15-year-old students, they find that early tracking increases educational inequality, because 
low-performing students are left behind. But they state that ‘in no case do some students gain at the 
expense of others’ (Hanushek and Woessmann 2006: 74).  
The advantage of the difference-in-difference approach is that unobserved differences between 
countries do not influence the analysis as long as they remain constant. What is crucial in order to 
identify changes within countries is a comparable sample across the two points in time. Because 
PIRLS and TIMSS sample by grade whereas PISA samples by age, Jakubowski (2010) argues that this is 
not the case.  
Van de Werfhorst (2013) analyses students’ performance in several countries before and after de-
tracking reforms and compares them to developments in countries in which no such reform took 
place. He finds that the education systems that became comprehensive experienced a stronger 
reduction in educational inequality compared to the others. However, although he tracks changes 
over a long period of time from 1964 to 1980, he cannot test the assumption that, without the 
reforms, countries that transformed their education system would have developed in the same way 
as countries that did not. This is a strong assumption because there are reasons why some countries 
moved from a tracked towards an untracked education system whereas others did not. Thus, 
comparative research might tend to overestimate the effect of tracking because it does not take into 
account unobserved differences between tracking and non-tracking countries. 
Instead of exploiting the institutional variation between countries, another possibility is to analyse 
the effect of de-tracking education reforms within single countries. Jakubowski et al. (2010) evaluate 
a Polish school reform postponing tracking by one year and Kerr et al. (2013) evaluate the Finnish 
comprehensive school reform from the 1970s postponing selection by five years. Using the gradual 
implementation of the school reform, Kerr et al.’s difference-in-difference estimates reveal that sons 
with low-educated parents improved due to the school reform. The effect size is remarkable, 
corresponding to one-quarter of the effect size of parental education. Even more remarkably, the 
reform had no negative effects on test scores of students from families with higher education, even 
though the age of selection was postponed by five years.  
To sum up, most studies find that de-tracking has positive effects for low-performing students and 
those from disadvantaged families, whereas there is no effect on students from advantaged families 
and high performers. Conceptually, the literature on the effects of differentiation in secondary 
education is restricted to formal differentiation. Methodologically, the literature might overestimate 
the effect of tracking when intertwined societal characteristics are not controlled. To cope with both, 
I analyse the relation between changes in schools’ social segregation and students’ performance 
within countries over cohorts. 
5. Research design, data, and variables 
5.1 Dependent Variables: Changes in Test Scores 
To investigate the effects of schools’ socio-economic segregation on students’ performance, I use 
students’ test scores in the PISA reading assessment as dependent variables (appendix, Table A2). 
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PISA assesses students’ capacity to apply knowledge to real-life settings, to analyse, reason, and 
solve problems. The PISA studies have been carried out every three years since 2000. In each round, 
one of the subjects was the main assessment area, starting with reading. Therefore, test results can 
be compared directly over time following the year in which a subject has been the main assessment 
area. Hence, reading scores can be compared over all waves; mathematics, from 2003 onwards; and 
science, from 2006 onwards. I shall focus on reading, although results for mathematics are very 
similar. The mean score in the first PISA round within OECD countries is 500 and the standard 
deviation is 100. To be better able to interpret the scores, the OECD estimates that about 40 points 
on the PISA scale correspond to the learning progress made by students within one school year 
(OECD 2013).  
To analyse the effects of changes in social segregation on high- and low-performing children, I use 
the percentage of a country’s ‘low performers’ and ‘top performers’ (appendix, Table A2). Top 
performers achieve proficiency level 5 or higher, being able to understand texts about unusual 
topics, apply their knowledge to new situations, and formulate and reflect on their own opinion. Low 
performers do not achieve proficiency level 2, because they are unable to summarize the main ideas 
of a text (OECD 2010). 
5.2 Independent Variables 
To measure students’ socio-economic background, I use the Economic Social and Cultural Status 
(ESCS) provided by the OECD (appendix, Table A3). This index is composed of three components: one 
for parents’ highest educational attainment, one for their highest occupational prestige, and one 
relating to affluence and cultural goods. To make it comparable over time, the OECD provides 
rescaled indices of the ESCS on the 2012 scale that I have merged to every dataset. In my sample, the 
median ESCS corresponds to zero; the 10th percentile, to -1.3; and the 90th percentile, to 1.2.  
To capture a country’s socio-economic segregation among schools, I measure how much of the ESCS 
variance lies among schools. The estimate comes from a multilevel analysis in which the ESCS as 
dependent variable is clustered within schools. The intra-class correlation multiplied by 100 
expresses the proportion of variance in social background explained by schools. In Finland, as the 
most equal school system, only about 8 per cent of the variance in ESCS lies between schools, 
whereas in Hungary, as the most socially segregated school system, this value amounts to 38 per 
cent (appendix, Table A1).  
Because I want to compare the index of social segregation among schools over time, it is crucial that 
the definition of schools does not change. There is no common definition of schools across countries, 
because schools in PISA serve primarily as sampling units. For example, in Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Romania, and Slovenia, study programmes within schools are 
treated as schools. In Italy, schools are defined as administrative units that might be located on 
different campuses; whereas in other countries, schools are defined by school buildings or by school 
principals (OECD 2013). Although the differences in definitions are a problem, this is less severe 
because I am using only changes within countries. The crucial aspect for the present approach is that 
the definition of schools within countries does not change over time. There is no indication of any 
change in the definition of schools in any of the Technical Reports. Another problem when comparing 
the index of social segregation over time arises from changes in the stratification variables used to 
sample schools. Therefore, when calculating the socio-economic segregation, I weight the data with 
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the final student weights at the student level and with the sum of students’ weights within a school 
at the school level. 
5.3 Research Strategy and Models 
To cope with the problem that tracking might be intertwined with unobserved societal 
characteristics, I shall look at changes within countries using five waves of PISA data. Therefore, I run 
country-fixed-effects models with the advantage of controlling for all differences remaining constant 
over time. To analyse only changes within countries, I take each variable and subtract its respective 
country mean over all waves. Because the socio-economic conditions in which children grow up can 
also change over time within a country, I control for within-country changes in the average and the 
standard deviation of the ESCS.i ii 
The dependent variable is changes in students’ reading performance. As independent variable, I 
include students’ ESCS and schools’ social segregation at the country level. In this model, the 
outcome of interest is the coefficient of school segregation capturing how changes in school 
segregation influence changes in countries’ mean performance. In Model 2, I add a cross-level 
interaction of social segregation with students’ ESCS to capture how changes in social segregation 
change the influence of parental background on students’ performance.  
To compare the effect across students from socio-economically advantaged and disadvantaged 
backgrounds, I graph the marginal effects of changes in schools’ social segregation on students’ 
performance. To analyse how changes in social segregation affect high- and low-performing 
students, I use the percentage of high and low performers in a country as alternative dependent 
variables.  
5.4 Sample 
I restrict the analyses to OECD and EU countries, excluding the OECD outliers Chile, Mexico, and 
Israel. This leaves me with 35 countries. Because I merge five waves for reading and four waves for 
mathematics, the sample includes more than one million students for reading and more than 900 
000 students for mathematics who attend more than 40 000 schools.  
6. Findings 
6.1 How Students’ Mathematics Performance Evolved Over Cohorts 
Over the 12 years between PISA 2000 and 2012, the reading performance of socio-economically 
disadvantaged students in the bottom quartile of the ESCS improved most in Germany, Poland, 
Switzerland, and Latvia. With about 40 points, the improvement in Poland and Germany corresponds 
to students’ progress within a whole school year. Socio-economically disadvantaged students 
performed worse a decade after the first PISA test in Sweden, Iceland, Finland, and New Zealand.   
Interestingly, in two of the countries in which students from socio-economically disadvantaged 
families improved most, namely Poland and Latvia, students from better-off families also improved 
most over cohorts. Similarly, in Sweden, where the performance of students from low-ESCS families 
deteriorated most, high-ESCS students also lost out. Only in the United States and France are there 
indications that one group lost out whereas the other gained. The positive correlation between 
changes in the top and the bottom quartile of the ESCS corresponds to 0.62. Thus, Figure 1 reveals that 
Excellence through equality of opportunity 
 
8 
there is no trade-off between the performance developments of students from different social 
backgrounds: they seem to be all in the same boat. 
Figure 1: Changes in reading performance for the bottom and the top ESCS quartile, PISA 2000–12 
 
6.2 How the Schools’ Social Segregation Evolved Over Time 
Whereas formal differentiation changed only in Poland over the period covered by PISA studies, 
social segregation among schools changed in several countries. Schools became less socially 
segregated from the first to the last cohort observed in Turkey, Poland, Japan, Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland, whereas they became more socially segregated in Latvia, Bulgaria, 
Portugal, Austria, and Romania. The changes range from a 12 percentage point reduction in Turkey 
to a 12 percentage point increase in Latvia (appendix, Figure A4). 
6.3 How Changes in the Social Segregation of Schools Relate to Equality and 
Excellence 
Do changes in an education system’s socio-economic segregation go hand in hand with changes in 
equality of opportunity? And if so, is increasing equality of opportunity brought about by decreases 
in excellence? To answer these questions, this section applies country-fixed-effects models using 
changes within countries between each wave, whereas the descriptive part gave an overview over 
changes from the first to the last cohort observed in PISA. 
When the socio-economic segregation among schools increases, so does the influence of students’ 
family background on performance (Table 1, Model 2). This is in line with my first hypothesis arguing 
that, for students from disadvantaged families, a more socially segregated school system means 
worse learning opportunities at school in addition to worse learning opportunities in families. When 
compared to the main effect of ESCS, however, the effect size is quite small: a student with a one 
standard deviation higher ESCS than her peers performs on average 38 points higher in the PISA 
reading test. This corresponds to what students learn within a whole school year. In comparison, a 
one percentage point reduction of social segregation from one wave to the next decreases the effect 
of the ESCS on students’ performance by 0.59. Because the maximum changes in social segregation 
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from 2000 to 2012 ranged approximately from -10 to +10 percentage points, the maximum effect 
would be to increase (or decrease) the effect of ESCS by about 6 points, corresponding to a 15 per 
cent increase (or decrease) in the effects of ESCS on performance. 
Remarkably, gains in equality of opportunity are not brought about at the cost of excellence. In 
contrast, increases in the social segregation of an education system go hand in hand with decreases 
in students’ average performance level (Table 1, Model 1). When the social segregation of an 
education system increases by about 10 percentage points, the average reading performance 
decreases by about 9 points. Thus, increases in equality of opportunity do not mean losses in terms 
of performance. 
Table 1: Changes in an education system’s school segregation and changes in reading test scores in PISA, country fixed-
effects models 
 Changes in reading 2000–12 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b/ci95 b/ci95 
ESCS 37.52
***
 37.35
***
 
 [37.09, 37.95] [36.93, 37.78] 
Changes in school segregation -0.86
*** 
[-1.12, -0.61] 
-0.88
*** 
[-1.14, -0.63] 
   
Changes in school segregation ×ESCS  0.59
*** 
[0.41, 0.78]
 
   
Constant 6.25
***
 6.27
***
 
 [5.64, 6.86] [5.66, 6.88] 
N students 1 068 472 1 068 472 
N schools 41 716 41 716 
N countries 35 35 
N waves 5 5 
Note: All models are controlled for being foreign-born, having a foreign-born mother, or having a foreign-born father at the individual level; 
and for changes in the mean and the standard deviation of the ESCS at the country level.  
Source: OECD: 2000–12 PISA database. 
6.4 Who Wins and Who Loses?  
We have seen that a decreasing social segregation is associated with a decreasing influence of family 
background. But how does this come about? Do socio-economically disadvantaged students improve 
at the expense of better-off students? To answer this question, Figure 2 predicts how the changes in 
schools’ social segregation affect students at the 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, and 10th percentile of the 
ESCS distribution within their country. The figure reveals that socio-economically disadvantaged 
students are most affected by changes in the socio-economic segregation between schools. For 
students at the 10th percentile of the ESCS distribution, it makes a difference of 25 points on the 
PISA reading test whether they live in a country that experienced the highest increase in social 
segregation compared to a country that experienced the highest decrease in social segregation. This 
difference is statistically significant and corresponds to progress made within more than one-half of a 
school year. The effect is about one-half of that size for students at the median of the ESCS 
distribution. For students at the 90th percentile of the ESCS distribution, the effect is close to zero 
and statistically non-significant for both reading and mathematics: high-ESCS students perform well 
regardless of whether the education system becomes more integrated or not.iii  
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Figure 2: Changes in schools’ social segregation and in reading scores by ESCS percentiles 
 
 
Is the same true for a possible trade-off between high- and low-performing students? I test this by 
using the percentage of students on the highest and the lowest performance levels as dependent 
variables. On average, a country has about seven to eight per cent top performers who are able to 
apply their knowledge to new situations and reflect on their solutions and opinion, and about 18 per 
cent low performers who are unable to summarize the main ideas of a text. When schools’ 
segregation increases in a country, the change in top performers is close to zero, whereas the 
percentage of low performers increases (appendix, Table A6). To conclude, reduced social 
segregation between schools is not harmful for either socio-economically advantaged or high-
performing students, whereas socio-economically disadvantaged and low-performing students 
benefit.   
7. Conclusion and discussion 
Do socio-economically advantaged students perform best in a differentiated education system 
whereas students from socio-economically disadvantaged families perform best in inclusive 
education systems? This chapter makes both a conceptual and a methodological contribution to this 
debate. In conceptual terms, I use a broad concept of differentiation, taking into account not only 
formal differentiation but also more ‘hidden’ forms of differentiation. Even in comprehensive 
education systems, schools can differ in terms of quality, and middle- and upper-class parents might 
find ways to differentiate their children from others. To capture not only formal but also hidden 
differentiation, I measure the social segregation among schools defined as the amount of ESCS 
variance between schools.  
Methodologically, I contribute to the literature by analysing only changes within countries over time. 
The advantage is that unobserved country factors such as ethnic diversity, socio-economic cleavages, 
or cultural values do not influence the results to the extent that they are time-constant. This is an 
advantage over the comparative studies using institutional variation between countries.  
90th
75th
50th
25th
10th
-50
-25
0
25
50
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
 i
n
 r
e
a
d
in
g
 s
c
o
re
s
-9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Changes in schools' social segregation
Source: OECD: 2000-2012 PISA database
Dotted lines mark 95% confidence interval
Figure 2: Changes in social segregation and
in reading scores by ESCS percentiles
Excellence through equality of opportunity 
 
11 
Using five waves of PISA data from 2000 to 2012, I find that when an education system becomes 
more socially inclusive, this is beneficial for students from socio-economically disadvantaged families 
and decreases the percentage of students with poor skills. At the same time, students from better-
off families are not affected by changes in social segregation. They perform well anywhere – 
independent of whether they attend schools with students from socio-economically disadvantaged 
families or not. A country’s proportion of top performers is not affected by changes in the social 
segregation between schools either. The findings indicate that there is no trade-off from promoting 
performance development in different groups of students. Instead, improving equality of 
opportunity, for example by making schools more socio-economically inclusive, promotes a higher 
average performance level without harming high-performing students.  
One limitation of the analyses is that I am not able to identify the mechanisms behind the findings. 
For further research, it would be interesting to explore why students from socio-economically 
advantaged families perform well, relatively independent of the school system’s social segregation. 
Another shortcoming is that I take into account only differentiation between schools but not 
differentiation within schools. 
To conclude, contrary to the beliefs of many middle- and upper-class parents, school systems in 
which students from different socio-economic backgrounds learn together in the same schools do 
not harm middle- and upper-class children. These children perform well everywhere, independent of 
how socially inclusive the education system is. Socio-economically disadvantaged students, on the 
other hand, improve their reading and mathematics performance when school systems – tracked or 
comprehensive – become more socially inclusive. Thus, in tracked as well as in comprehensive school 
systems, it remains a challenge to provide equal opportunities by ensuring that schools do not 
become segregated by social background, thereby trapping disadvantaged students in disadvantaged 
schools. One of the main challenges in this enterprise may well still be to persuade middle- and 
upper-class parents that this will not harm their children – and the aim of this article is to contribute 
to this. 
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Figure A1  
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Table A1: Between-school variance in ESCS by country and year 
 Proportion of between-school-variance in ESCS Changes in the proportion of between-school variance in ESCS:  
Deviation from country mean 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
TUR  40.7 28.8 32.5 28.4  7.5 -4.4 -0.8 -4.9 
POL 31.4 20.6 21.6 18.4 24.2 8.1 -2.6 -1.6 -4.8 0.9 
JPN  28.6 24.8 22.3 22.2  3.3 -0.5 -3 -3.1 
ESP 31.0 26.9 29.1 28.1 25.0 2.1 -1.9 0.3 -0.7 -3.8 
NLD  22.6 23.5 24.2 18.2  -0.8 0.1 0.8 -5.2 
CHE 22.2 24.1 18.8 18.2 17.9 1.4 3.3 -2 -2.5 -2.9 
FIN 12.3 10.7 9.7 10.5 9.1 1.5 -0.1 -1.1 -0.3 -1.7 
KOR 24.7 29.6 24.3 25.4 21.7 -1.2 3.7 -1.6 -0.5 -4.2 
AUS 26.5 24.5 21.6 22.8 23.7 2.6 0.7 -2.2 -1 -0.2 
LTU   24.2 23.1 21.6   0.5 -0.6 -2.1 
HUN 41.1 42.9 38.0 39.4 38.6 0.7 2.5 -2.3 -1 -1.8 
CZE 25.8 25.8 22.1 20.1 24.0 2.3 2.4 -1.4 -3.4 0.5 
ITA 25.9 29.6 23.2 26.2 24.8 -0.3 3.5 -3 0.1 -1.4 
CAN 18.2 18.9 19.6 19.1 17.8 -0.8 -0.1 0.7 0.1 -1.2 
ISL 15.1 15.8 13.7 13.9 14.8 0.6 1.2 -0.9 -0.7 0.2 
NOR 9.5 10.4 11.0 7.5 9.2 -0.1 0.8 1.4 -2.1 -0.4 
SVN   25.8 28.1 26.3   -1.1 1.2 -0.6 
DEU 26.0 30.8 23.5 23.8 26.6 -0.1 4.7 -2.5 -2.3 0.5 
GBR   19.8 20.4 20.6   -0.3 0.3 0.6 
EST   18.1 16.5 19.1   0.6 -0.9 1.7 
USA 24.8 23.2 26.6 30.4 26.5 -1.5 -3.2 0.3 4 0.2 
GRC 25.4 30.7 28.4 24.6 27.1 -1.8 3.5 1.2 -2.5 -0.1 
SWE 12.0 10.8 12.5 13.9 13.8 -0.3 -1.6 0.2 1.5 1.5 
FRA 25.1 29.1 30.0 29.4 28.0 -3.3 0.7 1.6 1 -0.4 
LUX  23.7 22.8 22.8 26.8  0.6 -0.2 -0.3 3.7 
Excellence through equality of opportunity 
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IRL 16.2 18.6 19.4 20.8 20.3 -2.5 -0.1 0.7 2.1 1.6 
BEL 23.3 29.2 25.4 28.8 28.1 -3.4 2.5 -1.3 2.1 1.4 
DNK 13.0 17.3 12.3 15.9 17.8 -1.7 2.6 -2.3 1.3 3.2 
NZL 17.3 15.7 16.1 19.5 22.4 0.1 -1.5 -1.1 2.3 5.2 
SVK  30.3 31.0 24.0 36.1  1.8 2.4 -4.6 7.5 
ROU 30.1  31.6 25.8 35.9 0.5  2 -3.8 6.3 
AUT 23.6 29.4 29.1  29.6 -4 1.8 1.4  2 
PRT 23.8 23.6 29.7 28.1 31.6 -2.5 -2.7 3.5 1.9 5.4 
BGR 31.6  41.1 32.9 40.7 -3.6  5.9 -2.2 5.5 
LVA 13.5 18.0 20.2 23.6 25.7 -5.1 -0.5 1.7 5.1 7.1 
Source: OECS PISA database 2000-2012 
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Figure A3: Development of proportion of between-school variance in ESCS in PISA 2000-2012 
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Figure A4 
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Figure A5 
 
Table A2: Mean score and percentage of top- and low-performers in reading by country and wave 
Excellence through equality of opportunity 
 
18 
 Mean score in reading % Top-performers: Students on the highest 
competence levels 5 and 6 in reading 
% Low-performers: Students below proficiency 
level 2 in reading 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
AUS 528 525 513 515 512 17.1 12.6 9 12 10.8 12.3 10.6 12.4 13.5 13.6 
AUT 507 491 490  490 8.3 6.4 8  4.4 13.8 19.8 20.8  19 
BEL 507 507 501 506 509 11.1 9.9 9.5 10.1 10.8 18.9 16.5 18.9 17.3 15.2 
BGR 430  402 429 436 1.6  1.4 2.1 3.7 40.1  50.6 40.5 39.1 
CAN 534 528 527 524 523 15.8 10.3 12.9 11.7 11.6 9.1 8.3 10.1 9.8 10 
CHE 494 499 499 501 509 8.6 5.6 6.8 7.3 7.8 20 15.4 15.6 16.1 12.9 
CZE 492 489 483 478 493 6.2 4.9 7.8 4.5 5.1 16.6 17.4 24.5 22.4 15.8 
DEU 484 491 495 497 508 8.1 7.5 8.6 6.9 8 22.1 21.7 19.4 17.8 14.2 
DNK 497 492 494 495 496 7.1 3.1 5 3.5 4.6 17.1 14.5 14.8 14.6 13.8 
ESP 493 481 461 481 488 3.1 2.6 1.2 2.6 4.5 15.8 19.3 25 18.9 17.4 
EST   501 501 516   4.9 5.2 7.1   12.9 12.5 8.4 
FIN 546 543 547 536 524 17.6 11.4 14.9 13.2 11.6 6.4 5 3.9 7.5 10.8 
FRA 505 496 488 496 505 7.5 5.1 5.2 8.8 11.5 14.7 16.3 21.2 19.6 18.1 
GBR   495 494 499   7.8 7.3 8.1   18 17.8 15.9 
GRC 474 472 460 483 477 4 3 2.2 4.2 3.4 24.1 22.9 27.1 20.7 21.5 
HUN 480 482 482 494 488 4 3 3.6 5.2 4.3 22.6 19.1 20 17.1 19.3 
IRL 527 515 517 496 523 13.6 7.2 10.3 6 10.3 10.6 10 11.2 16.5 8.9 
ISL 507 492 484 500 483 8 5.2 4.5 7.5 4.3 14.2 16.7 19.3 16.3 20.1 
ITA 487 476 469 486 490 4.5 3.5 4.3 4.8 5.5 18.1 22.3 25.8 20.5 18.7 
JPN 522 498 498 520 538 8.4 7 7.6 12.2 17.1 10 17.9 17.5 13 9.1 
KOR 525 534 556 539 536 3.9 9.5 20.7 11.6 12.6 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.4 7.2 
LTU   470 468 477   3.4 2.3 2.3   25.1 23.7 20.1 
LUX  479 479 472 488  3.6 4.2 4.7 7.5  21.1 22 25.5 21.4 
LVA 458 491 479 484 489 3.7 3.9 3.1 2.2 3.1 29.1 16.3 19.9 16.8 16.5 
NLD  513 507 508 511  7 7.9 8.9 8.9  10.2 14.4 13.3 13.3 
NOR 505 500 484 503 504 10.6 7.7 6.3 7.4 9 17.1 16.6 21.3 14.7 14.9 
NZL 529 522 521 521 512 17.9 15.2 14.6 15.1 12.9 13.6 13.5 13.7 13.7 15.4 
Excellence through equality of opportunity 
 
19 
POL 479 497 508 500 518 4.9 6.1 9.9 6.2 8.5 23 15.1 15.2 14.3 9.7 
PRT 470 478 472 489 488 3.3 2.3 3.7 3.9 4.6 25.6 21.3 24.1 17 18.1 
ROU 428  396 424 438 1.7  0.1 0.4 1 41.2  53.8 40.4 36.9 
SVK  469 466 477 463  2.1 4.2 3.4 3.5  22.8 27 22 27.9 
SVN   494 483 481   4.6 3.8 4   16.4 20.4 20.5 
SWE 516 514 507 497 483 10.4 9.6 9.6 8.2 6.8 12 11.7 14 16.8 22 
TUR  441 447 464 475  3.3 1.2 1.2 3.7  35.9 31.2 23.6 20.7 
USA 504 495  500 498 11.2 7.5  9.2 7 17.2 18.5  17.3 15.9 
averag
e 497 497 488 493 496 8.2 6.4 6.7 6.6 7.1 18.2 16.6 20.4 18.2 17.2 
Source: OECS PISA database 2000-2012 
 
Table A3: Mean and standard deviation of ESCS by country and wave 
 Mean ESCS Standard deviation of ESCS 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
AUS -0.02 0.04 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.79 0.88 0.73 0.68 0.79 
AUT -0.21 -0.26 0.03  0.08 0.85 0.86 0.8  0.85 
BEL -0.21 -0.03 0.07 0.16 0.15 0.88 1.01 0.86 0.85 0.91 
BGR -0.43  -0.47 -0.26 -0.28 0.88  1 0.94 1.05 
CAN 0.18 0.21 0.3 0.44 0.41 0.9 0.93 0.79 0.78 0.86 
CHE -0.17 -0.23 0.02 0.13 0.17 0.96 1.02 0.88 0.85 0.89 
CZE -0.46 -0.05 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 0.76 0.87 0.73 0.67 0.75 
DEU -0.01 0.01 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.9 1.08 0.89 0.85 0.93 
DNK 0.18 0.08 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.89 0.98 0.8 0.77 0.84 
ESP -0.74 -0.51 -0.46 -0.21 -0.19 1.14 1.15 1.02 1.01 1.03 
EST   -0.13 0.1 0.11   0.78 0.74 0.81 
FIN -0.18 0.06 0.19 0.39 0.36 0.92 0.97 0.76 0.72 0.77 
FRA -0.42 -0.32 -0.28 -0.14 -0.04 0.83 0.96 0.79 0.77 0.8 
GBR   0.13 0.25 0.27   0.75 0.75 0.8 
GRC -0.36 -0.3 -0.22 -0.03 -0.06 0.98 1.04 0.92 0.91 1 
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HUN -0.49 -0.31 -0.26 -0.16 -0.25 0.87 0.95 0.84 0.87 0.96 
IRL -0.33 -0.26 -0.06 0.08 0.13 0.91 0.93 0.8 0.8 0.85 
ISL 0.24 0.55 0.61 0.72 0.78 0.91 0.93 0.83 0.78 0.81 
ITA -0.33 -0.29 -0.19 -0.03 -0.05 0.94 1.08 0.9 0.92 0.97 
JPN  -0.42 -0.16 -0.07 -0.07  0.8 0.67 0.66 0.71 
KOR -0.57 -0.36 -0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.82 0.94 0.77 0.72 0.74 
LTU   -0.26 -0.22 -0.13   0.85 0.84 0.92 
LUX  -0.09 0 0.17 0.07  1.07 1.05 1.02 1.1 
LVA -0.61 -0.34 -0.44 -0.28 -0.26 0.81 0.88 0.79 0.79 0.89 
NLD  -0.08 0.16 0.13 0.23  0.97 0.82 0.73 0.78 
NOR 0.21 0.19 0.35 0.58 0.46 0.8 0.79 0.7 0.65 0.76 
NZL -0.07 -0.13 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.79 0.9 0.79 0.74 0.82 
POL -0.62 -0.41 -0.57 -0.3 -0.21 0.84 0.92 0.83 0.81 0.9 
PRT -0.81 -0.91 -0.8 -0.45 -0.48 1.11 1.34 1.24 1.13 1.19 
ROU -1.05  -0.69 -0.48 -0.47 1.08  0.88 0.8 0.94 
SVK  -0.25 -0.18 -0.1 -0.18  0.94 0.84 0.76 0.92 
SVN   -0.22 0.06 0.07   0.82 0.82 0.87 
SWE 0.15 0.08 0.26 0.39 0.28 0.82 0.98 0.79 0.78 0.82 
TUR  -1.15 -1.32 -1.14 -1.46  1.05 0.91 0.94 1.1 
USA 0.07 0.05 0.2 0.24 0.17 0.87 0.98 0.87 0.88 0.97 
Source: OECS PISA database 2000-2012 
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Table A4: ESCS percentiles, overall and within countries 
 10
th
 
percentile 
25
th
 
percentile 
50
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
percentile 
90
th
 
percentile 
overall -1.3 -0.9 -0.1 0.6 1.2 
within countries  
(deviation from country 
mean) 
-1.1 -0.6 0.0 0.7 1.2 
 
 
Table A5: Changes in reading and mathematics test scores in PISA and changes in an education system’s 
school segregation, country fixed-effects models 
 Changes in reading 2000-2012 Changes in mathematics 2003-2012 
 M1 M2 M1 M2 
 b/ci95 b/ci95 b/ci95 b/ci95 
ESCS 37.52*** 37.35*** 38.82*** 38.63*** 
 [37.09,37.95] [36.93,37.78] [38.36,39.29] [38.17,39.08] 
Changes in school 
segregation 
-0.86*** 
[-1.12,-0.61] 
-0.88*** 
[-1.14,-0.63] 
-0.30* 
[-0.56,-0.05] 
-0.34** 
[-0.59,-0.09] 
     
Changes in school 
segregation x escs 
 0.59*** 
[0.41,0.78] 
 0.47*** 
[0.27,0.67] 
     
_cons 6.25*** 6.27*** 3.80*** 3.82*** 
 [5.64,6.86] [5.66,6.88] [3.08,4.52] [3.10,4.54] 
N students 1068472 1068472 935228 935228 
N schools 41716 41716 36459 36459 
N countries 35 35 35 35 
N waves 5 5 4 4 
Note: all models are controlled for being foreign-born, having a foreign-born mom, and having a 
foreign-born dad at the individual level and changes in the mean and the standard deviation of the 
ESCS at the country level.  
Source: OECD: 2000-2012 PISA database 
 
Table A6: Changes in schools' social segregation and changes in the percentage of top and low performers 
 Changes in % top performers  
(proficiency levels 5+6) 
Changes in % low performers  
(below proficiency level 2) 
 M1 M2 M1 M2 
 b/ci95 b/ci95 b/ci95 b/ci95 
ESCS 5.20*** 5.23*** -10.05*** -9.97*** 
 [5.09,5.32] [5.11,5.34] [-10.22,-9.89] [-10.13,-9.80] 
Changes in school 
segregation 
-0.09*** -0.09*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 
 [-0.14,-0.05] [-0.14,-0.05] [0.17,0.37] [0.18,0.38] 
Changes in school 
segregation x escs 
 -0.08**  -0.32*** 
  [-0.13,-0.02]  [-0.39,-0.25] 
_cons 0.34*** 0.34*** -1.84*** -1.85*** 
 [0.23,0.46] [0.23,0.46] [-2.07,-1.62] [-2.08,-1.63] 
N students 1068472 1068472 1068472 1068472 
N schools 41716 41716 41716 41716 
Excellence through equality of opportunity 
 
22 
N countries 35 35 35 35 
N waves 5 5 5 5 
Note: all models are controlled for being foreign-born, having a foreign-born mom, and having a 
foreign-born dad at the individual level; and changes in the mean and the standard deviation of the 
ESCS at the country level.  
Source: OECD: 2000-2012 PISA database 
 
The effect on top-performers is statistically significant but very close to zero (and negative if 
anything). With each percentage point increase in schools’ social segregation, the percentage 
of top-performers decreases by 0.01 percentage points. As schools’ social segregation 
maximally changes by less than 10%, the maximum change is less than 0.1 percentage points. 
The effect on low-performers, on the other hand, is more substantial with a change of 3 
percentage points for the maximum change in schools’ social segregation. 
 
 
Table A7: The influence of changes in social segregation on changes in reading scores and on ESCS is robust 
when controlling for changes in educational expenditure or student-teacher-ratios  
 Changes in reading 2000-2012 Changes in reading 2000-2012 
 M1 M1 
 b/ci95 b/ci95 
ESCS 37.02*** 37.02*** 
 [36.53,37.51] [36.53,37.51] 
Changes in school segregation -0.87*** -0.91*** 
 [-1.17,-0.57] [-1.20,-0.62] 
Changes in school segregation 
x escs 
0.72*** 0.58*** 
 [0.51,0.93] [0.37,0.79] 
Changes in educational 
expenditure 
-0.00~  
 [-0.00,0.00]  
Changes in student-teacher-
ratios 
 -0.62 
  [-1.47,0.23] 
_cons 6.50*** 6.10*** 
 [5.78,7.22] [5.42,6.79] 
N 699203 769004 
Note: all models are controlled for being foreign-born, having a foreign-born mom, and having a 
foreign-born dad at the individual level; and changes in the mean and the standard deviation of the 
ESCS at the country level.  
Sources: OECD: 2000-2012 PISA database, Eurostat (2015): Education and Training for annual 
expenditure on public and private educational institutions per pupil/student in PPS, for all levels of 
education combined and student-teacher ratio and average class size (ISCED 1-3) 
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Notes 
                                                 
i I use the student weights given by the OECD and adjust them in such a way that each country wave 
contributes equally to the results. The standard errors are allowed to be clustered within schools to take the 
sampling design into account. 
ii To see whether my results are robust to changes in immigrant populations, I run two-step estimates in which 
the effects of being born in a foreign country and having a foreign-born mother or father can differ in each 
country and at each wave. Results do not change. 
iii Results are robust when controlling for changes in educational expenditure or student–teacher ratios 
(appendix, Table A7). 
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